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A "HUMANITARIAN" APPROACH TO
INDIVIDUAL INJURY
Christina B. Whitnan *
THE DUTY

To ACT: TORT LAW, POWER & PUBLIC POLICY. By

MarshallShapo. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1977. Pp. xxi,
203. $11.95.
A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS: THE UNKNOWN RISKS OF CHEMICALTECHNOLOGY. ByMarshallShapo. New York: The FreePress.
1979. Pp. xvi, 300. $12.95.
Individual injury law was once an important arena for the definition of shared values. It has increasingly become the domain of various species of systems analysts who measure legal results against
external norms defined by such disciplines as economics. Although
legal scholars continue to use the expectations and beliefs of ordinary men and women in fashioning rules for the redress of constitutional injuries, common-law scholars have become less willing to
ground legal principles in moral consensus. There are notable exceptions.' Among these is Professor Marshall Shapo, who, in two
recent works, attempts to develop a legal analysis of injury that "requires a substantial component of moral judgment" (Duty, p. xiii),
"an analysis centered on humanitarian elements and considerations
of fairness" (Duty, p. xv).
Professor Shapo's search for a moral content to law leads him to
conclude that power and dependence are the sources of legal obligation. From this conclusion Shapo constructs a model which, he suggests, can support an analysis of injury law in general. InA Nation of
Guinea Pigs, Shapo looks primarily at questions of administrative
law. He argues that those with the power to control scientific enterprises should exercise that power to avoid any risk of injury to the
unsuspecting citizens who rely on their expertise. In The Duty To
Act, Shapo turns to the tort law question of the scope of the duty to
render aid, and proposes that the law adopt a greatly expanded the* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1968, M.A. 1970, J.D. 1974,

University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. The most prominent of these can be found in R. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILiT' (1980), and Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972).
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ory of the obligation to act. 2
Shapo's thesis is that a moral consensus supports the use of
power to preserve individual life. He infers this consensus, in part,
from the expectations expressed by people involved in certain
power-dependent relationships. Those in power have a duty to respond to these expectations, says Shapo, because their power is
derived from "social nourishment" (Duty, p. 3). A significant
contribution of Shapo's analysis is his insistence that power and dependence cannot be understood without attention to psychological
realities such as images of authority and emotions of helplessness
and dependence. This is an important, if not wholly novel, insight
into injury law. In such emotions Shapo finds further evidence of a
moral consensus that power should preserve individual life. He then
attempts to explain how law should implement this consensus.
This is an admirable effort. However, it ultimately fails, for two
reasons: Shapo does not persuade the reader that this moral consensus is widely shared on more than a very abstract level; and he does
not translate his perceptions about emotions and images - his perceived moral consensus - into sufficiently precise guides for decision making. These have been recurrent problems for those who
wish to build tort models on moral principles. It has proved to be
extremely difficult to define shared values in terms broad enough to
support an argument from consensus, yet sufficiently specific to be
adopted and applied by judges. 3 In both books, Shapo devotes most
of his attention to the first task, defining a consensus, and makes only
peripheral suggestions for rules of decision.
The Duty To Act begins with the

working principle that one has a duty to aid others in situations in
which hazardous conditions necessitate assistance for the preservation
2. The duty to render aid has been defined narrowly by the common law. Although those
who choose to act have an obligation to act reasonably, there is no general duty to choose to
act for the benefit of another even when the failure to act is unreasonable. See, e.g., Union

Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 P. 281 (1903); Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257,
44 A. 809 (1897). Exceptions are made in certain defined situations where a duty to volunteer
aid is imposed - for example, when there is a pre-existing relationship between the defendant
and the injurer or the plaintiff, see, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d
425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976); Middleton v. Whitridge, 213 N.Y. 499, 108 N.E.
192 (1915); or when the defendant has undertaken to aid the plaintiff and has been derelict in
carrying out that task. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 P. 281 (1903).
3. A model designed to influence as well as to explain results must be sufficiently precise to
contribute to the principled resolution of individual cases, and yet sufficiently flexible to be
incorporated into existing structures by judges who are trained to decide limited questions with
reference to precedent. Richard Epstein, for example, has developed a precise and useful normative theory, but its adoption would require major changes in language, analysis, and procedure of the sort that only the most courageous and confident of common-law judges would
make.
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of life and of physical integrity [as well as other personal interests], and

in which one possesses the power to expend energy in that task without

serious inconvenience or possibility of harm to himself. [Duty, p. 69.]

In other words, those whom society has allowed to retain power have
a legally enforceable obligation to use that power to aid and protect
others.
The book consists entirely of the repeated application of this
"working principle" to situations in which a person or institution
might be required to protect others from hazards not of its own creation. Shapo applies his principle initially to economic relationships,
such as those between employer and employee, and businessman
and customer. He extends it beyond situations with contractual
"overtones" to include dependencies that arise solely because of
emergency. Finally, Shapo argues that modem man's increased reliance on government creates a public obligation to exercise the considerable power of nation, city, and state to come to the aid of
citizens. He begins his argument for government obligation with the
relatively simple case of aid to travellers on public highways and
extends it to the provision of services such as police and fire protection. He concludes by arguing that legislators, if not judges, should
recognize an obligation to provide welfare services to victims of
trauma and other dependent people.
Shapo's model purports to be all-encompassing. He does not reject the insights of welfare economics, but he finds them of use only
when they support the perceptions of "justice" that he finds compelling. Humanity, he argues, "refuses to balance nicely" (Nation, p.
90).
Unfortunately, Shapo's refusal to "balance nicely" leaves his
model imprecise and unhelpful. The social consensus that Shapo
discerns - inA Nation of Guinea Pigs, as well as The Duty To Act

-

puts ultimate value on the preservation of individual life, and requires that those who have the power to preserve life should exercise
that power. This principle is attractive in the abstract. But Shapo
does not explain how to apply it in practice - how to determine in
which cases to impose a duty to render aid. A key problem lies in
deciding who has power and who is dependent. Although Shapo
describes the sorts of expectations that are to be the bases of legally
enforceable obligations, his description is vague and elusive. For example, he appeals to "a representational background of aid and succor" (Duty, p. 21), or an "aura of reliability" (Duty, p. 31). Reliance
is apparently relevant, but in describing the role that it should play
in decision making, Shapo gives little guidance other than: "The de-
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pendence created by reliance on an established commercial enterprise, or by the employment relation, embodies a moral content that
properly may influence judicial decision" (Duty, p. 50).
Finally, Shapo acknowledges factors that cut against his "working principle," but again only in a very abstract fashion. The following summary of his analysis exemplifies his language and tone:
Generally, I shall suggest here that it is well to begin the analysis of
such personal injury cases by discovering where the locus of power lies
and estimating the consequences of that social geography. One should
then proceed to examination of the overlapping conceptualisms and
realities of fortuity, culpability, and choice, as well as the social infrastructure of ethical concern, which produce results in individual cases
that reflect the complex relationships these factors bear among themselves and with the facts of power. [Duty, p. xx.]
I suspect that judges may find this model difficult to understand and
apply.
I do not mean to suggest that the book does not discuss specifics.
Indeed, the bulk of the volume consists of a series of cases that illustrate specific power-dependence relationships. But there is no middle ground between case and theory. The cases serve merely to
illustrate abstractly stated principles, and do not yield particular legal rules for the resolution of future cases.
Of course we value individual life. The problem is that Shapo
argues for the easiest case. If asked, "Should you throw a rope to a
drowning man?" or "Should the government protect the public from
criminals?" the man-on-the-street would answer "Yes." The hard
question is not whether we value individual life, but why we do not
uniformly effectuate that value in our laws and regulations. The
common law does not always, or even usually, require that a rope be
thrown to a drowning man. The government seldom compensates
victims of crime for their injuries even when there has been a default
of police protection. It is not sufficient to say, as Shapo does, that
these results are inconsistent with our belief that life is of ultimate
value. He must address a question that he evades by failing to articulate concrete rules: Why have we accepted departures from our
general desire to promote the preservation of human life? Are the
arguments for these departures wrong?
Another reviewer of The Duty To Act has suggested that a general duty to come to the aid of another has not been imposed by the
common law for methodological reasons: the formal rule that there
is no duty to act except in certain easily defined cases is more efficient in the long run than an ad hoc consideration under negligence
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principles of the costs and benefits of action in each case.4 This analysis, though insightful and persuasive as an explanation of the common law, is not precisely responsive to Professor Shapo. Shapo is
not advocating an ad hoc analysis based on efficiency or any other
principle. Much of what he says can be read as an argument for an
alternative formal rule based on the ownership of power. Unfortunately, because he is not precise in formulating guides for decision in
specific cases, Shapo leaves the impression that case-by-case decision
making will be the norm under his model. Indeed, as he describes it,
the power-dependence model appears to be even more cumbersome
than negligence analysis, for it must account for emotions and expectations as well as more easily defined costs and benefits.
A greater problem is whether the consensus that Shapo purports
to discern even exists. That we are willing to discuss methodology in
this context suggests that we are willing to accept some loss of life in
the interests of ease of decision making. Or, at least, it suggests that
the preservation of life is not the only consideration that enters into
the formulation of legal rules.
By focusing on what potential beneficiaries expect from those
who hold power, Professor Shapo has biased his reading of community mores. As individuals we may greatly respect the value of our
own lives, but we do not always agree that the preservation of other
undefined lives is worth even relatively trivial sacrifices on our part.
In other words, there is a difference between what we expect for ourselves and what we expect to do for others.
Individuals are most likely to generalize from the rights they demand for themselves to the responsibilities that they owe to others in
a strongly cohesive society. Indeed, the argument made in The Duty
To Act assumes a society of extraordinary cohesion, composed of a
web of relationships so clearly defined that they can be the source of
legal obligations. These obligations, in Shapo's view, arise in even
the most transitory or ambiguous relationships. For example, in arguing that a cab driver owes a duty to his passenger to obtain identifying information when another driver causes an accident, Shapo
refers not to contract, but to "a community sense of what is fair in
the psychological context of trust and dependence involved" (Duty,
p. 19). Similarly, the obligation of one partner in an illicit affair to
save the other from an overdose of drugs "depends significantly on
the moral sense of the community" "that helplessness impose[s] an
obligation" (Duty, p. 42). But we may wonder whether our society is
4. See Powers, Book Review, 57 TEXAS L. REv. 523, 527-28 (1979).
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as cohesive - and these relationships as well defined - as Shapo
would have us believe.
Perhaps inevitably, Professor Shapo's efforts to derive a community consensus from the expectations of potential beneficiaries are
vague and impressionistic. For example, his argument that a hotel
owner has a duty, redressable in tort, to protect a hotel guest from
robbery and threat of rape proceeds as follows:
The room payment is the most obviously identifiable fuel of his duty,
but the obligation also arises from psychological bases related to the
circumstances of hotel keeping. Strong, if implicit in the background
of this decision, is the image of the weary traveler who wants to let
down his defenses and who assumes that corridors and rooms are secure. [Duty, p. 43.]
Good arguments exist, I believe, for imposing many of the obligations that Shapo advocates (including those described above), but
these arguments are not easily derived from a broad appeal to consensus. In numerous instances the appeal to obligation derived from
power evades clear description in terms of rules that would support
decision:
[A]n entrustment factor intrudes into the psychological background. [Duty, p. 18.]
At this juncture default in maneuvering ties back into the planning
function and becomes enwrapped in it, accenting the origin of a duty
that arises from the ability to deliberate and choose. [Duty, p. 49.]
One reason why it is difficult to translate consensus into rules is
that the consensus is unstable. Another reason is that legal rules do
more than evaluate the morality of action or inaction. Tort litigation
requires us to ask not only, "Was the defendant's act wrong?" but
also "Does the plaintiff have a right to defendant's money?" In The
Duty To Act, Shapo addresses society's view of moral obligation; he
pays less attention to the fact that tort law provides a monetary remedy. When the defendant's wrongful conduct consists of failure to
aid the plaintiff - say, failure to provide police protection, medical
care, or sound education - the moral question is often easier than
the question of compensation. We may feel, for instance, that the
government should provide police protection in a public housing
project, but is it so clear that tort law should require the public to
compensate victims of crime?
The transfer of money from one party to another through tort
litigation is not the most promising vehicle for expression of public
morals. On the one hand, draining public or private funds is often
too serious a sanction for breach of duty, particularly when there are
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many competing obligations.5 On the other hand, compensation of
seriously injured people is often too important to hinge it on moral
responsibility.6 It is no accident that the elucidation of value
through law now takes place primarily in other areas. For example,
both constitutional law and administrative law have advantages over
tort law for courts seeking to shape public morals. Courts deciding
7
constitutional questions may grant remedies other than damages,
and may limit inquiry to the principles essential to the American
vision of society. Administrative law offers options for informationgathering and the drafting of remedies that are often more varied
and flexible than those available to courts applying the common law.
In his second book, A Nation of Guinea Pigs, Professor Shapo
shifts his attention to questions of administrative law. Nation is superficially quite different from Duty. The second book undertakes
"to develop principles for the regulation of scientific progress" (Nation, p. 1). Professor Shapo's primary concern is the legal response
to scientific advances that entail uncertain, long-term risks. Because
scientific knowledge is often limited and incomplete, it is inevitable
that some dangers will appear only after widespread and long-term
public exposure - a process Shapo calls "market experimentation"
on public "guinea pigs." The ties to the analysis of The Duty To Act
should be apparent. Nation is, in effect, an application of the powerdependence model. Where Duty argues that the powerful have a
duty to render aid to the dependent, Nation argues that the powerful
- those in control of scientific enterprises - must avoid subjecting
the public to the risks of those enterprises.
Nation begins by discussing "what science is" (Nation, p. 1).
Shapo's purpose in explaining science to nonscientists is not to make
regulators more sympathetic to scientific values. Quite the contrary.
Professor Shapo's goal is to demonstrate - and he does this quite
persuasively - that the exercise of judgment plays as large a role in
science as it does in law. The accumulation of data by scientists cannot help us decide whether to incur imperfectly understood risks. By
definition, persuasive data is not available. Decision must turn, instead, on judgment and morality. Therefore, Shapo argues, deference to science, and even the law's traditional insistence that hard
5. See Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5 (1980).
6. See generally J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN
(1979).

7. See Whitman, supra note 5, at 41-62, for a discussion of situations in which injunctions
or declaratory judgments may be preferable to damage awards as a response to constitutional
wrongs.
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evidence be proffered to justify government intervention, are inappropriate when there is even a hint of serious risk. The question,
then, is what standard for intervention should replace deference to
science.
Like The Duty To Act, Nation asserts the existence of a moral
consensus to sacrifice other values for the preservation of individual
life. Here, too, Shapo argues through a series of ad hoc examples,
trying to demonstrate a social consensus not to incur unknowable
"manmade" risks. The strongest of these examples is the passage of
the Delaney Amendment,8 which represents "a legislative decision to
avoid substances with cancer-causing propensities even at great cost"
(Nation, p. 142). But again, Shapo fails to convince us either that
such a consensus exists or that it can serve as a concrete guide to
decision.
The argument from consensus is even harder to make in Nation.
The Duty To Act assumed a cohesive society. That we do not live in
such a society is one of the premises of Nation. In the earlier book,
Shapo focused exclusively on the expectations of the potential beneficiaries of the exercise of power. In Nation, Shapo's effort to understand the scientific point of view leads him to look also at the
expectations and assumptions of those in control of scientific enterprises. Unsurprisingly, those expectations differ from the consensus
Shapo discerns in the wider society. In consequence, he argues we
should distrust the exercise of power by scientists, industry, and even
by consumers who may choose to further their own short-term profit
while incurring undefined long-term risks to other, perhaps unborn,
individuals.
Shapo argues not only that deference to scientific judgment is unjustified, but also that "market experimentation" is wrong unless the
affected individuals consent. However, express consent to exposure
to a particular hazard will not often be forthcoming or obtainable.
Consumers may lack the information or the expertise fully to understand the options, and scientists, because of their own limited knowledge, may be unable fully to inform them. When consent is
unavailable, Shapo advocates an extremely risk-averse approach.
His "working principle" in this book is that "a responsibly hypothesized possibility that an experiment [e.g., a product, or the side-effects of technological development] will cause any type of long8. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976). In essence, the clause provides that not the slightest
amount of an additive is to be tolerated in food if that additive has been found to cause cancer
in man or animal. This ban applies even if the findings of cancer are based on the experimental use of very large amounts of the substance.

HeinOnline -- 79 Mich. L. Rev. 769 1980-1981

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 79:762

lasting personal harm should be grounds for prohibiti[on]" in the
absence of clear consent (Nation, p. 45).
The role of law, says Shapo, is to "mediate among" scientists and
the public (Nation, p. 21), and thereby ensure that scientists understand and implement this "working principle." But the hard question is not whether scientists and the public should communicate.
That seems obvious. The question is, rather, whether they can communicate. Shapo asserts that law should "cut through impressions of
expertise to gain dispassionate analysis" (Nation, p. 20). That helps
little, for what we need to know is whether and how the public, or
lawyers as its representatives, can think dispassionately about the
risks inherent in progress. Can anyone understand the problem
without expertise? Can expertise be acquired without introducing
bias? Shapo urges lawyers to be skeptical. But he does not tell us
how lawyers and regulators can acquire the information essential to
an intelligent skepticism without relying on scientists. His answer,
instead, is that regulators should respond with a bias of their own a bias that he claims to draw from public consensus, "a societal commitment to risk avoidance that might almost be said to be natural to
a modem level of existence" (Nation, p. 141).
However, it is unclear that a social commitment of this sort exists.
To be sure, people do expect that they will be protected from many
risks. Shapo correctly perceives that scientific advances, in combination with the expanding role of government, have increased our expectations that we will be protected from many injuries and illnesses
long regarded as inevitable. But it is too simple to ascribe the incurring of risks to callousness, greed, and insensitivity. Largely as a
result of science's increased power to trace fine causal links, we have
begun to realize that the most ordinary of activities (e.g., turning on
a light) subjects other individuals to anticipated and unanticipated
risks. It is difficult to maintain a sense of community, or shared obligation, when we are aware that our way of life necessarily entails
risks to each other and to future generations. It is easier to ignore
the problem than to recognize openly that we are, indeed,.willing to
sacrifice other lives to preserve our lifestyle.
Even if Shapo's "working principle" does reflect a consensus, I
wonder whether it will help lawyers and scientists to reach reasoned
decisions. As in Duty, Professor Shapo's guides for decision making
are vague. Two examples:
Taking a somewhat resigned perspective on the previously established
existence of the risk, [the Eighth Circuit decision in Reserve Mining Co.
v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975)] responds to the tensions created
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by conflicting interests that rend residents in the same community, at
once maintaining the role of the judiciary as legislative interpreter as
well as independent preserver of public health and safety. Inculcated
in this approach is the idea that all law is a balance. Yet even in its
recognition of competing interests, the decision teaches that in a "day
of synthetic living," the basic line of the balance has shifted toward
risk aversion because of the very artificiality of the processes that fuel
that life-style. [Nation, p. 205.]
The central point is that ultimately both scientific conclusions and social decisions must be meshed into unified judgments. [Nation, p. 257.]
Shapo does draw on certain traditional legal doctrines, but they
tend to end, rather than to further, discussion. For instance, Shapo's
plea that risks not be incurred without full understanding and assent
on the part of potential victims is derived from the tort doctrine of
informed consent. But in Shapo's paradigm cases - where the most
advanced scientific researchers only imperfectly understand the
risks, where the potential victims are unidentified or unborn, or
where the experts vigorously disagree - the doctrine of consent
works, as Shapo acknowledges, as an absolute barrier because the
necessary information cannot be communicated. In these situations,
the doctrine of consent does not further choice. Instead, it bars action.
The other major doctrinal tool in Professor Shapo's arsenal is the
placing of the burden of proof. He argues that the consensus supporting risk-averseness requires that we place the burden on those
who would "experiment" with unconsenting citizens - that we exercise regulatory powers to elicit information on risks, and that we employ government power to avoid any risk of serious injury. Like the
doctrine of consent, placement of the burden of proof ends discussion, for proof in the paradigm cases is, by definition, unavailable.
On the last day of its 1979 Term the Supreme Court of the
United States decided a case challenging the adoption by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of an approach
quite similar to that advocated by Professor Shapo. 9 OSHA had issued a standard placing stringent limitations on exposure to benzene.
The Court described the agency's position as follows:
Whenever a carcinogen is involved, OSHA will presume that no safe
level of exposure exists in the absence of clear proof establishing such a
level and will accordingly set the exposure limit at the lowest level feasible ....

Given OSHA's cancer policy, it was in fact irrelevant

whether there was any evidence at all of a leukemia risk [at the level
set by the more lenient previous standard]. The important point [to
OSHA] was that there was no evidence that there was not some risk,
9. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
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however small, at that level.10
The Supreme Court refused to read the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970"1 to permit such a risk-averse approach. Instead,
the Court read the Act to impose the burden of proof on OSHA.
Under the Court's decision, before the government can issue a standard limiting exposure to a suspect substance, it must demonstrate
that the proposed standard "is reasonably necessary and appropriate
to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment."' 2 The
Court stressed that "'safe' is not the equivalent of 'risk-free,' ",p3 and
refused to ascribe to Congress the "view that the mere possibility
that some employee somewhere in the country may confront some
risk of cancer is sufficient basis for the exercise of the Secretary's
power to require the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars
14
to minimize that risk."'
In Nation, Shapo correctly points out that legal demands for
proof of the sort imposed by the Supreme Court ask for a certainty
that science cannot deliver. By hypothesis, in this area the burden of
proof cannot be carried. To employ it as a decision making principle
is to answer hard questions while pretending to defer to data collectors. The Supreme Court answers the question of indeterminable
risks conclusively in favor of incurring the risk. But Shapo would
employ the burden of proof in the opposite way, and his answer is
just as conclusive. Shapo claims here, as he does in Duty, that his
bias reflects a moral consensus. But this is not communication. It is
flat.
Nation, in contrast to Duty, pays more attention to the factors
that destroy consensus, that make decision difficult. Professor Shapo
acknowledges that significant groups in society urge expansion of
scientific inquiry even when the costs of such inquiry are unknown,
and that there is such a thing as overload of information about risks,
an overload that could lead to "the kind of continuous personal deliberation that would occupy one's life exclusively with thoughts of
physical hazard" (Nation, p. 141). And he is aware that a risk-averse
perspective could well entail significant costs, both short-term (as the
loss of industrial jobs) and long-term (as the loss of unsuspected benefits from basic research in genetics engineering.) However, he fails
to account for these concerns adequately. At best he concedes that
10. 100 S.Ct. at 2855 (emphasis original).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
12. I00 S.Ct. at 2863.
13. 100 S.Ct. at 2864.
14. 100 S.Ct. at 2869.
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773

they may be relevant to decision making. Although much of Nation
consists of extended descriptions of regulatory action concerning
particular scientific byproducts, Shapo suggests not legal rules, but,
again, only "considerations" and "factors."
Much is attractive in Professor Shapo's enterprise. I admire his
willingness to appeal to image and emotion in an effort to bring law
in accord with lay expectations. But the weight to be given to image
and emotion requires precise definition. Shapo asks lawyers to serve
as facilitators of communication, but he has yet to master the very
difficult problems of defining a shared morality and translating it
into rules of decision.
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